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Abstract
This report documents the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 11492 “Secure Architectures in the
Cloud”. In cloud computing, data storage and processing are offered as services, and data are
managed by external providers that reside outside the control of the data owner. The use of such
services reduces the burden of the owners in managing their data, and may provide significant cost
savings. However, cloud computing introduces new security and privacy concerns. In fact, there is
little consensus on how to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data in cloud
computing scenarios. Also, it is unclear to what extent parties can be held accountable in case
something goes wrong. In this seminar, we searched for architectures, modelling approaches, and
mechanisms that can help in providing guarantees for cloud security. We proposed the concept
of verification-as-a-service that can guide architectures for verification of cloud architectures and
configurations, as well as results of computations. We also proposed architectures for organising
customisability of security and privacy for cloud customers.
Seminar 4.–9. December, 2011 – www.dagstuhl.de/11492
1998 ACM Subject Classification K.6.5 Security and Protection
Keywords and phrases attestation, auditing, cloud computing, security architectures, security
modelling, verification
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/DagRep.1.12.11
1 Executive Summary
Wolter Pieters
Christian W. Probst
Sabrina de Capitani di Vimercati
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Wolter Pieters, Christian W. Probst and Sabrina de Capitani di Vimercati
Introduction
In cloud computing, data storage and processing are offered as a service, and the data resides
outside the control of the owner. It is often argued that clouds improve security, as the
providers have more security expertise than their (smaller) customers. However, despite
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theoretical breakthroughs in cryptography, there is little consensus on how we can provide
architectural solutions guaranteeing that cloud data remains confidential, uncorrupted,
and available. Also, it is unclear to what extent parties can be held accountable in case
something goes wrong. In seminar 11492 Secure Architectures in the Cloud, we searched for
architectures, modelling approaches, and mechanisms that can help in providing guarantees
for cloud security. The main question was which cloud-specific security architectures should
and could be devised, and how they can be matched to security policies. The seminar was
attended by researchers from different academic and industry communities, making it possible
to propose integrated solutions and research directions that transcend disciplines. Four main
topics have been the subject of this seminar (see also [14]):
1. Data protection. Data outside the data owner’s control implies that privacy and even
integrity can be put at risk. Guaranteeing the privacy and integrity of the data, whether
stored in the system or communicated to external parties, becomes a primary requirement,
and has raised the attention of both individuals and legislators. Cloud providers have to
properly protect the privacy of (possible sensitive) information when storing, processing
or sharing it with others [19], and have to adopt adequate access control solutions for
enforcing selective access to the data. New approaches have emerged for identifying
persons and roles and linking them to access privileges, such as identity-, attribute-,
claims-, and data-based access control (e.g., [7, 15]). We discussed challenges of the cloud
to the notions of privacy, accountability and user empowerment, their legal, ethical, and
architectural implications, and possible solutions.
2. Simulating physical constraints in the cloud. In the cloud, we cannot easily enforce where
data is stored and how long, and from where it is accessed. Location-based access control
aims at limiting access to specific locations, thereby seemingly putting physical limitations
back in place [23]. Measures proposed include use of GPS, trusted platform modules
(TPMs), but also physically unclonable functions (PUFs) [21]. Also, data could be moved
away from attacks [17]. With respect to time, mechanisms have been proposed to assure
deletion of data in the cloud [9, 12, 22]. We assessed to which extent these approaches are
sufficient to simulate physical constraints, and which architectural solutions are needed
to make such forms of assurance possible in practice.
3. Misuse detection. Many methods have been proposed for intrusion detection, penetration
testing and digital forensics. Are these sufficient for cloud environments? The seminar
identified necessary adaptations to system and threat models as well as security metrics,
to adequately indicate which attacks are possible and which are actually happening, and
thereby reduce cybercrime.
4. Splitting the clouds. Public clouds, containing data from different parties, are not deemed
suitable for particularly sensitive information. This means that decisions will have to be
made about which data to put in the cloud and which data not, which security properties
to outsource and which not, and how to make sure that the entire system conforms to
the security requirements (cf. [4]). The seminar investigated suitable architectures for
“splitting the clouds”. For example, in “security-as-a-service”, not only IT infrastructure
is rented, but also the security that is added to it. For authentication this seems to work
pretty well, but how far can this concept be stretched to other security properties such
as confidentiality and integrity?
Processing encrypted data was discussed in the parallel seminar 11491 Secure Computing
in the Cloud. This report covers the results of the seminar on Secure Architectures in the
Cloud, abstracts of presentations, and proceedings of the working groups. The topics have
been restructured during the seminar, and we will refer back to the topics originally proposed
where appropriate. Several follow-up initiatives have been assigned to the participants.
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Main Findings
As a general observation, we concluded that clouds require a different kind of architectural
decisions than traditional information systems. In complex systems such as clouds, we cannot
do lots of things manually anymore. For example, there is usually no way to inspect a cloud
for evidence manually after an incident. This means that the architecture needs to allow for
automation of such tasks, by providing not only functional services, but also meta-services
to perform automated maintenance, recovery, etc. Moreover, the processes that make use
of such meta-services need suitable architectures themselves. In particular, the following
meta-services are needed:
Automated policy checking,
Automated configuration verification,
Automated incident management,
Automated auditing, and
Automated forensics.
These processes could be deployed again in (different) clouds, but then the same security
concerns apply to them as well.
In this sense, the cloud paradigm begs the question whether we can do everything as a
service (XaaS). The participants came up with many different XaaS concepts. In particular,
we proposed the concept of verification-as-a-service, which can refer to both the verification
of the results of computations, as well as the verification of the (security) architecture
and configuration in place at the cloud provider. The former is well-known in the field
of electronic voting systems (cf. [20]); the latter resonates with the practice of security
auditing. Verification-as-a-service is the main focus in relation to original topics 3 and 4.
Specific challenges relate to the verification of negative properties (something is not the
case in the architecture) and verification of the results of randomised algorithms. Also,
testing-as-a-service could be employed to test functional and non-functional properties of
cloud services.
As an instance of simulating physical constraints (topic 2) in relation to verification-as-a-
service, we discussed the possibilities for verifying the location of data in the cloud (cf. [23]).
One proposal is to integrate GPS with trusted hardware (such as TPM) to prove locations.
Verification-as-a-service provides a paradigm to organise accountability in the cloud. This
could be realised by different techniques, for example by:
Transparency of architecture/configuration (inspection/attestation),
Forensics (e.g., watermarking),
Regulation (precaution) and enforcement,
Incident response (logging), or
Creating incentives.
Verifying the integrity of data seems to be more intuitive than verifying its confidentiality.
With integrity, it is possible, for example, to compare two different copies. With confidentiality,
one would have to prove that only certain parties possess a copy. It only seems to be possible
to falsify this after the fact, when it is indeed discovered that data has been leaked. Even
in that case, one would need some kind of watermark to prove who leaked the data, for it
might have been the user as well as the provider. How to develop a service that provides
such watermarking in relation to confidentiality-as-a-service has been identified as an open
problem, in relation to topic 4 (splitting the clouds).
Especially on the user side, accountability can be further enhanced by modifiability, or
customisability, which allows the user to adapt services to his or her own policies. This
requires negotiation on policies, not only between the user and the initial provider, but
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also between providers within the supply chain (cf. [24]). Customisability is the main topic
discussed in relation to original topic 1 (data protection). Again, special services can be set
up that allow the user to achieve this for multiple cloud services at the same time, which
would amount to modifiability-as-a-service. Such services could be standardised to make
sure that they really empower the user, by employing certain privacy policies themselves,
and providing an understandable interface (cf. [6, 10]). We would then have achieved
“standardised customisability”.
We formulated several attacker models that lie behind these proposals. Many standard
attacker models are problematic in the cloud. An evil/malicious cloud service provider
implies that we cannot solve anything without advanced encryption methods, which are
costly or even infeasible in many scenarios. Assuming that computations are performed in
the clear, we have to assume that the cloud service provider is indifferent, not curious. Thus,
we trust the cloud provider on the issue of confidentiality, in the sense that we do not expect
the provider to leak or misuse data intentionally. However, the provider may still be a:
Sloppy provider (makes mistakes),
Lazy provider (simplifies computations), or
Greedy provider (reduces security to save money).
The sloppy and lazy provider might compromise the integrity of the result of computa-
tions. Verification of results would be a countermeasure here, for example by executing the
computations on multiple, independent clouds.
Greedy providers are willing to violate policies for economic reasons, thereby exposing
the data to insider or outsider threats. Although we do not assume malice on the side of the
provider, we do assume malice on the side of other cloud users, who may or may not have
specialised access (e.g., administrators). In relation to the greedy provider, one would want
to have some means to verify the architecture in place.
Especially if services have been customised, one would want to have some kind of assurance
that there is actually a change in configuration taking place based on the customisation. We
proposed the development of a tool suite to support remote measurements of architectural
variables, which would include existing proposals (cf. [2, 18, 25]). Care needs to be taken
that acquiring such information does not violate customer privacy or company property
rights [3]. Also, even if the architecture would be (partly) known, the user would then need
meaningful support to choose among different providers (and thereby different architectures).
This provides another incentive to develop quantitative models that can indeed calculate
overall security risks from system architectures, based on existing qualitative approaches [1, 8,
11, 13, 16]. The user can then compare risks and costs to make decisions [5]. Such decisions
could even be made in real-time based on information on the current security situation,
leading to what has been called fluid information systems [17].
A remaining question is how to create incentives to invest in cloud security. If there is
no immediate impact, investments may lag behind with respect to threat levels. Ironically,
you can gain a competitive advantage by making your competitors invest in security. Do
we really need big scandals to improve security? In any case, achieving more security by
(self-)regulation, whether by law, seals, or otherwise, requires architectures such as proposed
here, for it is impossible to impose constraints if they cannot be verified.
In conclusion, this seminar proposed architectures for verifying the results of cloud com-
putations, verifying the configuration of cloud architectures, and supporting customisability
of cloud services in terms of security. These were defined in relation to cloud-specific attacker
models. Visual representations of the proposed architectures can be found under the results
of the working groups. Open problems are defined at the end of this document.
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3 Overview of Talks
3.1 Adaptive Information Security for Cloud Services: Relating
Security Requirements to Design
Arosha Bandara (The Open University – Milton Keynes, GB)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Arosha Bandara
Joint work of Bandara, Arosha; Yu, Yijun; Tun, Than Thien; Nuseibeh, Bashar
Information security involves protecting valuable information assets from possible harm.
With the increasing use of cloud computing services, the technical and social contexts in
which software applications are expected to operate become increasingly dynamic. As a result,
the assets, their values, and attack scenarios can easily change. This increases the challenge
of finding out what the information assets are, who their owners are, where in the system
vulnerabilities lie, and the extent to which the security requirements need to be enforced.
In such an environment, information security has to be highly context-sensitive: software
applications must adapt to the changing contexts and respond quickly and appropriately to
ensure that the requirements for information security are not violated. We call this notion
Adaptive Information Security, and focus on three of its prerequisites in the context of cloud
computing: (1) understanding user requirements for cloud applications; (2) traceability
between requirements, design and implementation of cloud services; and (3) adaptive design
for dynamic contexts.
3.2 Security Assurance in Virtualized Infrastructures
Sören Bleikertz (IBM Research – Zürich, CH)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Sören Bleikertz
Joint work of Bleikertz, Sören; Schunter, Matthias; Groß, Thomas; Eriksson, Konrad; Mödersheim, Sebastian;
Main reference S. Bleikertz, T. Groß, S. Mödersheim, “Automated Verification of Virtualized Infrastructures,” in
Proc. of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security (CCSW’11) , pp. 47–58, 2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2046660.2046672
Cloud computing and virtualized infrastructures are often accompanied by complex con-
figurations and topologies. Dynamic scaling, rapid virtual machine deployment, and open
multi-tenant architectures create an environment, in which local misconfiguration can cre-
ate subtle security risks for the entire infrastructure. This situation calls for automated
deployment as well as analysis mechanisms.
We present a platform that combines a static information flow analysis and a virtualization
assurance language with state-of-the art verification methods. The system discovers the
actual configurations of diverse virtualization environments and unifies them in a graph
representation. Using graph traversal, it computes the transitive closure of information flow.
The language integrates descriptions of virtualized infrastructures, their transformations, their
desired security goals, and evaluation strategies. The different verification tools range from
model checking to theorem proving; this allows us to exploit the complementary strengths of
methods.
We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach by a real-world case study of a virtualized
infrastructure of a global financial institution.
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3.3 Privacy and Security Requirements in the Cloud
Travis D. Breaux (Carnegie Mellon University – Pittsburgh, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Travis D. Breaux
Joint work of Gordon, David G.; Breaux, Travis D.
Main reference D.G. Gordon, T.D. Breaux, “Managing multi-jurisdictional requirements in the cloud: towards a
computational legal landscape,” in Proc. 3rd ACM Workshop on Cloud Computing Security
(CCSW’11), pp. 83–94, 2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2046660.2046678
Cloud computing enables organizations to cheaply and quickly obtain computer resources
on an as-needed basis, allowing them to more efficiently and effectively provide services
to their consumers. Despite the cloud’s ubiquitous appearance, however, data provenance
within the cloud presents a multi-jurisdictional challenge, as privacy laws and regulations
that govern data may be applicable based upon the residence of the entity who owns the data,
the type of organization that uses the data, and any intermediaries facilitating the handling
of the data, such as cloud service providers. To this end, we are developing a modeling
framework for determining jurisdictional applicability in which these entities are respectively
designated as data subjects, data users, and data custodians. We foresee organizations using
this framework during system design to determine and resolve the complex issues about
where to provide services, store and transfer data.
3.4 Versatile Key Management for Secure Cloud Storage
Sebastian Graf (Universität Konstanz, DE)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Sebastian Graf
Storing data on cloud-based infrastructures facilitates infinite scalability and all-time availab-
ility. Putting data in the cloud additionally offers a convenient way to share any information
with user-defined third-parties. However, storing data on the infrastructure of commercial
third party providers, demands trust and confidence. Often simple approaches, like merely
encrypting the data by providing encryption keys, which at most consists of a shared secret
supporting rudimentary data sharing, do not support evolving sets of accessing clients to
common data.
Based on well-established approaches regarding stream-encryption, we propose an adaption
for enabling scalable and flexible key management within heterogeneous environments like
cloud scenarios. Representing access-rights as a graph, we distinguish between the keys used
for encrypting hierarchical data and the encrypted updates on the keys enabling flexible join-
/leave-operations of clients. This distinction allows us to utilize the high availability of the
cloud as updating mechanism without harming any confidentiality. Our graph-based key
management results in a constant adaption of nodes related to the changed key. The updates
on the keys generate a constant overhead related to the number of these updated nodes.
The proposed scalable approach utilizes cloud-based infrastructures for confidential data
and key sharing in collaborative workflows supporting variable client-sets.
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3.5 Energy Efficiency in Cloud and Related Security Issues
Toni Mastelic (TU Wien, AT)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Toni Mastelic
Joint work of Mastelic, Toni; Brandic, Ivona; Emeakaroha, Vincent; Maurer, Michael; Breskovic, Ivan
URL http://www.infosys.tuwien.ac.at/linksites/FOSII/index.html
Cloud computing is a promising approach for implementing scalable on- demand computing
infrastructure. It includes business aspects like SLAs and customer-provider relationship, as
well as organizational issues like scheduling, resource allocation, all the way to a technical
details like VM monitoring and application deployment. While energy efficiency is mostly
managed on an organizational level, it is realized by actions on the level of clusters, physical
machines, VMs or even a single application.
By monitoring customer’s applications for a purpose of more efficient scheduling, provider
reaches the privacy border. Also, by applying energy efficient measures like time-sharing
VMs and running multiple VMs on a single physical machines, provider creates vulnerable
environments for customer’s applications. Can customer trust provider’s measurements; how
secure is his application; is customer’s privacy being threatened; these are all the questions
which cannot be neglected for benefit of energy efficiency, but should certainly be considered.
3.6 Privacy and Integrity Issues in Data Mining Outsourcing
Anna Monreale (University of Pisa, IT)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Anna Monreale
Joint work of Monreale, Anna; Fosca, Giannotti; Dino, Pedreschi; Hui (Wendy), Wang; Laks, Lakshmanan V.S.;
Main reference F. Giannotti, L.V.S. Lakshmanan, A. Monreale, D. Pedreschi, H. (Wendy) Wang,
“Privacy-preserving data mining from outsourced databases,” in S. Gutwirth, Y. Poullet, P. De
Hert, R. Leenes (eds.): Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: an Element of Choice, pp.
411–426, Springer Netherlands, 2011.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0641-5_19
Spurred by developments such as in cloud computing, there has been considerable recent
interest in the paradigm of data mining-as-service. A company (data owner) lacking in
expertise or computational resources can outsource its mining needs to a third-party service
provider. In this paradigm two problems arise: i) both data and the knowledge extractable
from the outsourced database are considered private property of the corporation (data owner),
and so there arises serious privacy issues ii) a dishonest service provider may return inaccurate
mining results to the data owner, so there arises serious integrity issue of the mining results.
To protect corporate privacy, the data owner has to transform its data and ship it to
the server, send mining queries to the server, and recover the true mining results from the
extracted knowledge received from the server. To detect security issues, the data owner has
to apply an efficient and practical auditing approach that can verify the correctness and the
completeness of mining results.
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3.7 To Cloud or Not To. Simple Musings on Cloud Viability
Radu Sion (Stony Brook University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Radu Sion
Joint work of Sion, Radu; Chen, Yao;
Main reference Y. Chen, R. Sion, “To Cloud Or Not To Cloud? Musings On Costs and Viability,” in the ACM
Symposium on Cloud Computing (SOCC 2011).
URL http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/~sion/research/cloudc2010-draft.pdf
In this talk we aim to understand the types of applications for which cloud computing
is economically tenable, i.e., for which the cost savings associated with cloud placement
outweigh any associated deployment costs.
We discover two scenarios. In an (i) “unified client” scenario, once cloud-hosted, applica-
tions are meant to be accessible only to a single cloud customer (or small set of associates).
It then becomes important to ensure that the cost savings (mainly computation-related) can
offset the often significant client-cloud distance (network costs etc).
In a (ii) “multi-client” setting on the other hand, outsourced applications serve numerous
different third parties. We show that then clouds begin to act similarly in nature to content-
distribution networks – by comparison, their better network integration is simply too good
to pass on, when compared to locally hosting the applications (and incurring associated
network costs).
Ultimately, we hope this work will constitute a first step in an objective evaluation of the
technological side of costs of outsourcing and computing in general.
3.8 On Securing Untrusted Clouds with Cryptography
Radu Sion (Stony Brook University, US)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
© Radu Sion
Joint work of Sion, Radu; Chen, Yao;
Main reference Y. Chen, R. Sion, “On Securing Untrusted Clouds with Cryptography,” in the ACM Workshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2010).
URL http://www.cs.sunysb.edu/ sion/research/sion2010wpes-pcost.pdf
In a recent interview, Whitfield Diffie argued that “the whole point of cloud computing is
economy” and while it is possible in principle for “computation to be done on encrypted
data, [...] current techniques would more than undo the economy gained by the outsourcing
and show little sign of becoming practical”. In this talk we explore whether this is truly
the case and quantify just how expensive it is to secure computing in untrusted, potentially
curious clouds.
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3.9 BOTCLOUDS – The Future of Cloud-based Botnets?
Martijn Warnier (TU Delft, NL)
License Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 3.0 Unported license
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Main reference K. Clark, M. Warnier, F.M.T. Brazier, “BOTCLOUDS – The Future of Cloud-based Botnets?,” in
Proc. of the 1st Int’l Conf. on Cloud Computing and Services Science (CLOSER 2011).
URL http://homepage.tudelft.nl/68x7e/Papers/botclouds.pdf
Many Cloud Service Providers (CSP) offer access to scalable, reliable computing resources
following a payas-you-go model. Research into security of the Cloud focuses mainly on
protecting legitimate users of Cloud services from attacks by external, malicious users. Little
attention is given to prohibit malicious users from using the Cloud to launch attacks, such as
those currently done by botnets. These attacks include launching a DDoS attack, sending
spam and perpetrating click fraud. This paper discusses the threat of Cloud-based botnets,
or botclouds and the need for new techniques to detect them. Two experiments show how
simple and cheaply these attacks can be launched from botclouds.
4 Working Groups
4.1 Privacy, Data Protection and User Empowerment
In this working group, the focus was on supporting the user in making meaningful choices
with respect to security and privacy of data. To enable such choices, an interface is needed
in which the user can obtain the relevant information, and make her choices known. This
requires careful selection of the information and choices presented to the user, as well as the
possibility to actually change decisions on the fly, that is, to move from one cloud service
to another whenever the security requirements change. It also requires the propagation of
information all the way up the supply chain from infrastructure to user interface, which
requires cooperation of the different providers, and therefore standardisation. Important
questions are:
Modifiability: How to reach-back for security/ privacy customisation?
Diversity / supply chains: How to manage these issues across multiple clouds?
Scalability: How to make the approach work without overloading the user with information
and choices?
Mobility: How to swap in/out sub-clouds?
User affordances: If clouds don’t enshrine real-world process complexity, what happens?
Auditing: How to make auditing manageable if all security is customised?
4.2 Verifying Configurations
The objective of verifying configurations is to know that a certain architecture configuration
is running on a cloud. Such an architecture consists of both hardware and software. An
example application is when law requires an “adequate level of protection”, for example for
privacy-sensitive data. The high-level research problems are:
How does the cloud provider itself know what is running on its systems?
How can one transfer such complicated knowledge to the cloud user?
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An additional challenge is that the cloud provider has right to its own privacy: one may not
be able to study, or at least not publish, the underlying hardware because it’s a business
secret. This requires mechanisms to ensure the confidentiality of the architecture, while
ascertaining its high-level security properties. Logging may help as a basis, but if the logs
are maintained by the cloud provider, trust is still required.
A basic architecture was proposed for verifying architecture configurations in the cloud
(Figure 1). In this architecture, measurements performed by a Measurement Provider provide
the basis for an assessment by a Configuration Verifier, which is then communicated to
the user. Depending on confidentiality requirements on the architecture, different ways of
communicating the information can be proposed.
Apart from verification of the configuration, the user would also be interested in verifying
relevant data security properties:
locality of data,
integrity of data,
confidentiality of data,
availability of data,
deletion of data, and
non-repudiation of data leakage.
4.3 Verifying Computations
In the working group on verifying computations, the basic assumption was that, in order to
assure integrity of results, it is not enough to check the systems. Following up on electronic
voting research, there needs to be a way to check that the results of calculations are correct.
One simple way to do this would be to perform the calculations in multiple independent
clouds, and then use a voting algorithm to determine the correct result. This would provide
statistical confidence about the correctness. However, it is not evident how to assure that
clouds are independent, as for example to independent SaaS providers may rent infrastructures
from the same IaaS provider. Also, if computations are not deterministic, one cannot expect
the results to be the same for different instances.
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A basic architecture was proposed for verifying the results of computations in the cloud
(Figure 2). In this architecture, a proof of the result is generated by a Proof Generator
service, which can be checked by a Proof Verifier service. The latter may or may not be
localised on the user device. If it is not, for example because of the complexity of the task,
another (simpler) mechanism is needed to assure the user of the correctness of the verification
of the proof.
5 Open Problems
At the end of the seminar, we identified the following open problems and research directions:
Architectures for trusted computing without trusted hardware,
Security product lines for the cloud,
Further refinement of cloud attacker models,
Architectures to provide accountability for data leakage,
Corporate social responsibility and transparency in relation to cloud security,
Use cases for secure cloud architectures,
Methods for security-related decision support for cloud consumers,
Specification of the relation between technical measures and regulation,
Further refinement of the Verification-as-a-Service concept,
Development of a measurement/reconstruction suite for cloud architecture configurations,
and
Development of methods for cloud forensics.
All of these problems have been assigned to seminar participants as follow-up activities. For
details, please contact the seminar organisers.
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6 Panel Discussions
Two cloud security related seminars took place simultaneously at Schloss Dagstuhl from
December 4 to December 9, 2011. Seminar 11491 Secure Computing in the Cloud focused on
the verifiability, auditability and confidentiality of computation and data, while seminar 11492
Secure Architectures in the Cloud discussed architectures for verification of computations
and configurations, as well as customisability of cloud security and privacy. The joint panel
discussion featured the panellists Radu Sion, Martijn Warnier, and Marianne Winslett
(11492), as well as Ari Juels, Ahmad Sadeghi and Nigel Smart (11491).
Topics of the panel discussion included, but were not limited to, the following. The panel
discussed the “big question” whether small or medium-sized enterprises are more secure in
the cloud or using their own systems. Naturally, no answer was found. Here as well, an
estimation of the security of cloud providers compared to the security of local infrastructures
is essential. For this purpose, self-regulatory or government-initiated penetration testing
agencies were suggested in order to assess different cloud infrastructures in an objective
fashion.
We discussed the security consequences of providing complete infrastructure-as-a-service
(IaaS) images in an App-Store like fashion for clouds. This raises security concerns both for
the users of such images (potentially malicious software pre-installed) and for the providers
of the images (full erasure of sensitive, private data from the images). Consequently,
automated checks are needed to address these problems – with some technical details still
being challenging.
Other topics included the efficient verifiability of outsourced computation in the general
setting that the cloud provider is not fully trusted. Moreover, the internet-of-things was also
a topic. That includes car-to-X communication as well as device clouds. The latter allows
the creation of ad-hoc clouds, e.g. for the purpose of sharing an internet connection with
people who are travelling in order to save roaming fees.
Further, we discussed the possibility of buying insurance for the data stored in the cloud.
This, however, requires precise definitions of (a) the coverage of the insurance (data loss,
leakage or corruption) and (b) how to assess whether such an event has indeed occurred.
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